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A Decisionist Approach to Democratic 
 Political Order
Marin Terpstra*
‘There is no getting away from the need in a democracy for the peo­
ple to decide.’1
1 Introduction
The two most noteworthy ideas of Bonnie Honig’s article are, to my mind, 
(1) her shift away from deliberative democracy to ‘democratic politics in 
medias res’ (p. 118) and (2) the paradox of politics, discovered in Rousseau’s 
Social contract, determined as the undecidability between volonté générale 
and volonté de tous or, in general, between ‘the ideal’ and ‘the real’ (p. 124). 
In other words, what democracy is and what it should be are matters dif­
ficult to separate. Normative concepts of democracy are inseparable from 
democratic politics itself: how can there be an outsider position from which 
‘true’ democracy becomes visible? In her view, the ongoing debate between 
decisionists and deliberativists disregards the
‘fecundity of undecidability, a trait that suggests that our cherished 
ideals – law, the people, general will, deliberation – are implicated 
in that to which deliberative democratic theory opposes them: vio­
lence, multitude, the will of all, decision’. (p. 124)
So, this idea of undecidability is at the heart of a new way of thinking, 
which leads us to ‘the material conditions of political practice’ (ARSP p. 1). At 
the end of her paper, she clearly states her position, asserting that we
* Assistant Professor in Social and Political Philosophy and senior researcher, Centre for 
 Ethics, Radboud University Nijmegen.
1 Bonnie Honig, ‘Between Decision and Deliberation: Political Paradox in Democratic 
 Theory’, American Political Science Review (101) 2007, p. 1­17, at p. 7. All further citations 
from this paper are indicated, by page number in this issue, directly in the main body of 
the text. References that are to the original article only are marked (ARSP).
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‘get a politics, in which plural and contending parties make claims in 
the name of public goods, seek support from various constituencies, 
and the legitimacy of outcomes is always contestable’ (p. 135).
My question, when reading the text, concerns her perception of decisionism. 
Honig tries to avoid the dilemma of ‘deliberation’ and ‘decision’, and opens 
up new avenues for taking a theory of democracy beyond this dilemma. Her 
argument, however, limits itself to a critical analysis of deliberative theory. 
The role played by ‘decision’ remains mostly implicit, and the concept is 
hardly elaborated. Accordingly, I intend, in this comment, to explore what 
a decisionist theory of democracy would look like. I will show that Honig’s 
key concepts – political paradox and democracy – can be reformulated in 
decisionist vocabulary. My basic argument is that decisionism offers a 
more adequate articulation of social reality than varieties of normativistic 
and, especially, deliberative theories. This exploration will make clear that 
Honig does not overcome the dilemma, but rather takes sides with a deci­
sionist theory of democracy.
My comment consists of three parts. Firstly, I will clarify the meaning of 
decisionism. Secondly, I will try to explain the paradox of politics (or politi­
cal paradox) in decisionist terms. Thirdly, I will give an outline of a decision­
ist theory of democracy. My response to Honig’s article will focus on some 
other authors than those she discusses. In particular, I will draw on Spinoza, 
as a classic thinker, and Panajotis Kondylis (and a bit of Niklas Luhmann) as 
a theorist of decisionism.
2 What is decisionism?
Honig refers to decisionism in three ways. Firstly, ‘decisionism’ is not under­
stood in its own terms, but rather in terms of the definition proposed by its 
opponents. Decisionism then seems to point to a position in discussion or 
deliberation that refuses to give up certain things because it appeals to cer­
tain loyalties. ‘Decisionists, deliberativists argue, cannot give valid justifica­
tions for the principles they champion.’ (p. 116) Secondly, decisionism refers 
to an antagonism within a ‘binary logic’: politics seems to be reduced to 
deciding in favour of one of two opposing parties. This opposition (or antag­
onism) can be framed as friend and enemy: Germany and Russia (Schmitt), 
bourgeoisie and proletariat (Marx), liberalism and democracy (Mouffe), 
freedom and totalitarianism (Cold War), democracy and terrorism (Bush), 
and so on. Thirdly, Honig uses and accepts the concept of decision many 
times, mainly to criticise deliberative theorists. For example, she writes, 
‘the people (…) must nonetheless discern or decide the difference between 
the legitimate lawgiver and the pretender’ (ARSP p. 6). She accepts Gould’s 
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criticism, who faults ‘Habermas and his followers for their neglect of “effec­
tive decision­making” (…)’ (ARSP p. 14, note). The first definition, of course, 
is not a very convincing attempt to overcome the dilemma of ‘deliberation’ 
and ‘decision’. The second definition fits in this proposal, but is too limited 
and simplified. The third meaning of decision, as an important category in 
social and political philosophy, might be part of a decisionist theory. That is 
what I intend to make plausible.
The most consistent and profound decisionism can be found in the work of 
Panajotis Kondylis (1943­1998), who wrote in Greek and German. He dubbed 
the second of the aforementioned definitions ‘militant decisionism’.2 It 
assumes that loyalty defined by a distinction between friend and enemy 
is a correct political attitude, attesting to faith in or rejection of the foun­
dation of a particular political order, itself a representation of a particular 
people, culture, nation, class or whatever. The standard or ultimate norm in 
this case confines willingness to participate in political deliberation. This 
explains why partisans of deliberative democracy, for their part, reject any 
position that endangers a free and open participation in public debate. For 
them, decisionism constitutes a proviso that endangers deliberation. As 
Kant would say, ‘decisionist’ attitudes ‘become the subjects of just suspi­
cion, and cannot lay claim to sincere respect, which reason accords only to 
that which has stood the test of a free and public examination’.3
From the perspectives of its opponents, decisionism can only be a mili­
tant form of political behavior, incompatible with democracy. As Kondy­
lis points out, this variety of decisionism is itself a form of normativism, 
claiming a priori knowledge of what is ‘good’ political behavior. It has to be 
distinguished from ‘descriptive decisionism’, according to which decisions 
are the stuff of which the human world is made, not a standard, ‘blind’ com­
mitment with some founding principle or political power. The opposition 
between ‘decision’ and ‘deliberation’ is normative: it concerns possible ways 
of participating in political life, based on a moral view on the foundation of 
political order. In both cases, however, the moral foundation itself is a mat­
ter of decision – accepting or rejecting a particular attitude.
Descriptive decisionism sees decisions as basic elements of a social ontolo­
gy.4 A social ontology tries to explore what being together means. The fun­
damental idea of a decisionist social ontology is that a unifying concept of 
2 Panajotis Kondylis, Macht und Entschei dung: Die Heraus bildung der Weltbilder und die 
Wertfrage, Stuttgart: Klett­Cotta 1984, p. 7.
3 Immanuel Kant in the A­edition of his Kritik der reinen Vernunft (my translation of p. xi, 
note).
4 The concept of a social ontology was explicitly put forward in Kondylis’ posthumously 
published work Panajotis Kondylis, Das Politische und der Mensch: Grundzüge der Sozial­
ontologie. Band I, Berlin: Akademie Verlag 1999.
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society is not the primary reality, but a construction that must remain fic­
tional. ‘Society’ is a fiction, because social reality remains split or differenti­
ated. Society is presented as a unity only in communication. Social reality is 
not a unity. So, the first principle of a decisionist social ontology is that being 
together is fundamentally marked by discord, disunity, differentiation.5 If 
we start from this premise, all social activities (including publishing nor­
mative theories about democracy) become decisions.
3 The concept of decision
Up to this point, I have left uncertain the precise meaning I assign to the 
concept of decision. In my opinion, it has nothing to do with free will or 
arbitrariness. It does not matter whether I decide or choose to write this 
paper and not another, or that I have no choice. What counts is that, for an 
observer, the audience or the reader, it appears as if I decided to write this 
paper. In social reality, any utterance or act of communication could have 
been otherwise in the minds of those that are confronted with it. In this 
sense, decision stands for contingency in communication or social practice 
in general. Of all things one could expect others to do or say, people actually 
decide to do or say this, and not something else. This marks decision as an 
indispensable social (and political) category. Decisions made by others form 
the contingent, heteronomous social reality to which I have to respond. The 
same holds for the observers of my utterances: they have to make sense of it, 
independent of the meaning these utterances have for me.
In a decisionist social ontology, the available, ultimate alternatives are 
acceptance or rejection of claims or decisions made by others. (Of course, 
many decisions made by others are unimportant to me.) Certainly, this 
could be accepted even by deliberativists. But it becomes controversial as 
soon as decisionism goes one step further, and questions the horizon or con­
text of justification within which people interact. People may perceive such 
a horizon as self­evident, but as long as there are people who contest this 
frame of thinking, remaining within it counts as a decision. Legitimacy 
5 What follows is also inspired by the works of Niklas Luhmann and Peter Fuchs. I take 
systems theory as compatible with descriptive decisionism, which has its roots in Max 
Weber’s sociology. In this respect, and despite their differences, Luhmann and Schmitt 
have much in common, cf. Chris Thornhill, ‘Niklas Luhmann, Carl Schmitt and the Modern 
Form of the Political’, in: European Journal of Social Theory (10) 2007/4, p. 499–522. I will 
not go into the theory of social differentiation. I take some notions from systems theory 
that will be helpful in formulating a decisionist theory of democracy. This theory is also 
inspired by Spinoza’s dictum that democracy closely parallels what he calls ‘nature’, and 
what I call social ontology. Democracy is a political order that is as sparing as possible in 
its appeal to fictions of unity or foundation; Benedictus de Spinoza, Theological­Political 
Treatise, Jonathan Israel (ed.), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2007, Chapter 16.
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and justice, to give only two examples, are part of the political game. If 
 people dispute whether a policy is just or legitimate, they have to accept the 
terms and rules of deliberation first. Acceptance of support or justifications 
depends on the decisions of others.
We need not go into the details of how the acceptance or rejection of deci­
sions made by others leads to a complex society. Society can take on differ­
ent forms, depending on the specific decisions that are made and accepted.
If we return to our social ontology, we must also be aware of the fact that we 
may suppose people’s minds proposing, supporting, accepting or rejecting 
ideas outside the social and political order. These claims appear as decisions 
when they are uttered, i.e., as a selection of ideas from a plurality of alterna­
tives. Contingency is the social appearance of the unknown spiritual realm 
(people’s minds) surrounding society. If there is a spiritual foundation of 
social and political order, it is transcendent – a silence.6 But, of course, we 
can always make conjectures about its content.
4 Two axioms of a decisionist social ontology
Two axioms of this social ontology are basic for what follows: (1) the dif­
ferentiation of social reality and people’s consciousness (‘spiritual reality’); 
and (2) the will to power which drives individuals to present themselves in 
social reality.
The reason that I invoke the first of these axioms is the importance it has 
for the articulation of political order. ‘Spiritual reality’, i.e., the existence of 
‘psychic systems’ outside the social system, is often mystified. It is identi­
fied with God, a natural or historical telos, or a collective mind, ‘social imag­
inary’ or universal principles, in order to come to grips with what escapes 
the social system, but is still supposed to affect it. By giving social and polit­
ical order a spiritual foundation, the psychic systems or individual minds 
are negated or actually disciplined to conform to this foundation. So, on the 
one hand, we have social reality (what people really do and say) and, on the 
other, a plurality of observations of social reality. The two do not match. 
On the contrary, because everyone observes social reality from his or her 
own position (marked by his or her ‘history’), representations of social and 
political order tend to be different. I think this is a basic truth of social real­
ity. This insight yields two approaches to the basic differentiation of social 
reality: a universalistic and a relativistic one. The former stresses the com­
mon grounds and the final spiritual unity of social and political order; the 
latter stresses the particularity of perspectives. Here lies the paradox of lib­
eral democracy: it allows the free and equal expression of ‘psychic systems’ 
6 Niklas Luhmann & Peter Fuchs, Reden und Schweigen, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1989.
R&R 2008 / 2     
156
in the social system,7 while at the same time founding social and political 
order on universal principles such as freedom and equality. Although antag­
onism and consensus, or militant decisionism and deliberative democracy, 
are real possibilities, they both refer to the same social ontology.
Normativist theories of democracy, which try to show that there can be a 
universally binding spiritual foundation of social and political order, even 
one that conforms to liberal principles, are nothing more than an expan­
sion of a monologue intérieure, the reflections of a philosopher, for example, 
on an imagined social practice. These theories conceal the differentiation 
or disunity expressed by the truths of social ontology. These truths imply 
(1) that a proposal for a spiritual foundation of social and political order (a 
concept of legitimacy, for example) is in social reality nothing but a claim; 
(2) that the meaning of this claim in social reality depends mainly on the 
interpretation others give of it; and (3) that the acceptance or rejection of 
the claim depends on the decisions made by others. This is not to deny that 
people can agree. But agreement or consensus is only a temporary, fragile 
fiction of community in which social reality seems absent. It is the illusion, 
for example, that the social system is animated by reason, expressing the 
conditions of the possibility of communication itself.
The second axiom of decisionist theory is that the substance of human real­
ity is conflict, discord, disunity, in short, the existence of contradictory, irrec-
oncilable claims.8 Whatever people do when, entering the public space, they 
are present to each other, they are always driven by a ‘will to power’. They 
want to be heard or recognized, or even worse, they want to be followed, 
obeyed, applauded. This principle implies, in particular, that even the ways 
in which people try to deal with conflict are contested. In some cases, some 
people will use violence as a means to enforce their claims. In other cases, 
people will use rhetoric, negotiations, deception, revelation or philosophy 
to convince their opponents. The principle of decisionism is that there are 
no a priori standards that can determine the right or just way of dealing 
with conflict. There is only a complex of conflicting claims to what is right 
or just. If I am not completely mistaken, it is exactly this kind of social the­
ory that Honig is aiming at when she refers to ‘a political understanding’ 
of democracy, to ‘the irreducible political condition’ (ARSP p. 6), ‘the real 
human world as we find it’ (p. 124), and so on.
7 Historically, this becomes clear in the emergence of political rights (freedom of speech, of 
press, and so on) and the decline of religion as potestas spiritualis, i.e., the privatization of 
religion.
8 Panajotis Kondylis, Macht und Entschei dung (supra note 2).
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5 Decisionism and the political paradox
The paradox of politics is connected to the concept of undecidability. In my 
view, those things are decidable that can be ‘deduced’ from norms, prin­
ciples, rules given in advance. Undecidable matters require a real decision 
in the strong sense of the word. Decisionism holds that in the end all social 
matters are undecidable. Undecidability also leads us back to our former 
idea of disunity and differentiation. Being part of social reality means 
being alone with one’s own observations and thoughts, and the way social 
facts (including persons and ideas) appear to us. We will never know for 
sure whether the world in which we live is ‘the real thing’. This is all the 
more true for things like ‘political order’ and the legitimacy of political deci­
sions.
A decisionist concept of political order could be phrased like this. Political 
order is based (a) on a decision to establish a way of dealing with conflict­
ing claims (constitution); and (b) the availability of the means to enforce 
the results of this order. Thus understood, social and political order can be 
nothing other than a modus vivendi, a way to live together despite conflict­
ing claims. There can be many kinds of constitutions, from the rule of one 
person (monarchy) to the rule by deliberation (liberal democracy). Even an 
adherent of deliberative democracy should accept this concept, if he or she 
has any interest in politics.
The paradox of politics appears as soon as one starts talking about the legit­
imacy of political power at a given moment, confronting a potestas directa 
to a potestas indirecta: the spiritual or moral ground of a genuine exercise of 
power.9 In her evaluation of these kinds of paradoxes, Bonnie Honig appar­
ently refuses to accept that such a potestas indirecta is accessible by any of 
the procedures proposed by Habermas, Benhabib, and others. The question 
is undecidable; therefore, we have to decide. If the people decide for a delib­
erative procedure, it becomes a potestas directa, which has all the usual con­
sequences that derive from the exercise of power.
What complicates the matter is that participants in a political order will 
usually view this order as founded on moral principles, appealing to the 
citizenry and allowing them to imagine an ideal political order that con­
forms to those principles better than existing practices. Although political 
order can be described as a machinery of decisions having effects in society, 
9 The concept was used in the Middle Ages for the right of the Church or the Pope to intervene 
in the affairs of princes who had a potestas in temporalibus in case they sinned or interfered 
with the affairs of the church. The doctrine of the potestas indirecta was rejected by Thomas 
Hobbes on the ground that there cannot be two powers that rule simultaneously. Neverthe­
less, the concept remained influential, more implicitly in ‘Christian’ democratic societies, in 
the analogous idea that secular rule does not have the highest moral authority.
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it also presents itself as the collective agent instituted to ‘solve problems’ 
or ‘reach goals’. Its opponents, on the contrary, will present it as failing to 
do so. Perhaps the deliberative concept of democracy is more closely linked 
to political discourse, expressing what this discourse seems to promise. By 
contrast, the decisionist concept of democracy observes political practices or 
operations. A decisionist would say that normativist theories of democracy 
take politics nominally. They fall victim to the optical illusion that moral 
claims present themselves as objective social reality.10 This, I think, is what 
Bonnie Honig is trying to say in her discussion of Habermas’s reference to 
Paris and Philadelphia (p. 130­134).
A decisionist political theory is not concerned with legitimacy or justice, 
but with the acceptance or rejection of political decisions. Political decisions 
are collective decisions about decisions (made by others). Political decisions 
bind or control, forbid or guide the decisions made by others, i.e., citizens. A 
political order is the system of decisions about decisions ruling the entrance 
of people into society. The degree of liberty or freedom in society can be 
measured by the quality and amount of decisions of people that are not 
controlled by political decisions. Liberty can take the form of explicit rights. 
I added ‘collective’ because there are all sorts of decisions made by others 
about decisions people make. The choice of speakers in this conference, for 
example, is not the decision of the audience. It is decided for them. Although 
I would not call this political, it is important to note that it could become 
political. If citizens make decisions for other citizens, there is a need to deal 
with the conflicts that may arise.
This is not the place to elaborate further on the concept of decision. Let me 
finish this section with a brief remark concerning one implication of the 
idea of political decisions as decisions about decisions. This implication 
is the need for some hierarchy of decisions that shapes the specific form 
of social and political order. Decisions of courts can be rejected by higher 
courts. Public servants can make decisions that are overruled by their supe­
riors. Decisions of government can be renounced by parliament. National 
laws may be subordinated to supranational laws. The question arises 
whether there is a primeval decision at the top of this hierarchy that may 
overrule all other decisions. This question haunts Carl Schmitt’s political 
theory.11 Who or what will decide in case of an exceptional situation? What 
are the grounds of such a decision?
Schmitt was fully aware of the paradoxical nature of these questions, refer­
ring to the political paradox of which Bonnie Honig speaks. The primeval 
decision has to be made when confronted with the decision made by others 
10 Panajotis Kondylis, Macht und Entschei dung, p. 56 ff (supra note 2).
11 Especially Carl Schmitt, Politische Theologie, Berlin: Duncker und Humblot 1922.
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– a foreign nation – implying an existential threat. It is a power out of our 
control that forces us to decide who we are and what price we are prepared 
to pay in order to remain what we are. Schmitt’s political theory is in line 
with the social ontology I formulated earlier. The enemy imposes on us the 
question of identity. Political order itself is established as a response to het­
eronomy, which is rejected and must be resisted. It is only then that society 
becomes a unity: in the face of death or destruction, the integrity of social 
and political order emerges. The presumption then is that society will not 
become unified from within.
6 A decisionist theory of democracy
In my view, modern liberal democracy developed due to positive recogni­
tion of the social ontology we described earlier. Therefore, its core is deci­
sionist.12 In this sense, democracy means that political power renounces any 
claims regarding truth or justice, and orients itself to ‘public opinion’, the 
social expression of the plurality of thoughts present in the environment of 
the social and political system. The way in which this is done may vary. In 
any case, the operation of the political system includes entrances through 
which public opinion can be expressed. Voting, of course, is the clearest 
example. However, some democratic states are more inventive in creating 
forms of citizen participation.
It is important to notice that in a modern democracy people are free to 
express themselves in the public domain; to this effect, an idea of ‘the peo­
ple’ or ‘popular sovereignty’ is not needed. The political system will function 
anyway. It is not ‘the will of the people’, the volonté générale, not even the 
volonté de tous, that is expressed. People express themselves in the demo­
cratic domain. It is up to them to determine whether and what they express. 
Seen from the point of view of ‘the people’13, i.e., of people’s minds (observa­
tion of society), the democratic domain is that part of the social order in 
which they can express the thoughts they decide to express, knowing that 
they will have some impact on the political system. Seen from the point of 
view of the political system (‘the prince’), the democratic domain is a part 
of the system that is marked by contingency. One never knows for sure in 
which direction the political system will be forced after elections, to give 
only one clear example. Of course, the political system will do anything to 
control the democratic domain by propaganda, manipulation or creativity, 
12 Cf, Hermann Lübbe, ‘Dezisionismus – eine kompromittierte politi sche Theo rie’, Schweizer 
Monatsheft (55) 1976, p. 949­960.
13 ‘(…) a conoscer bene la natura de’ popoli, bisogna esser principe; ed a conoscer bene quella 
de’ Principi, conviene esser populare’ [Machiavelli, introduction to Il Principe].
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to reduce contingency. In this sense, people who work in the political sys­
tem will ‘fear’ the people, as other people fear God – and rightly so.
As noted before, political order is a system of decisions regulating other 
decisions. For example, whatever a government decides, it has to conform 
to laws. A democracy is a political order in which at least some political deci­
sions are taken by ‘the people’. Usually, people may decide indirectly about 
their constitution or the members of the government, so they have some 
control over the way they are ruled. Democracy, however, refers to a much 
broader concept, which is closer to the social ontology described heretofore. 
Following Spinoza, it is of interest to distinguish between democracy as the 
power of the multitude (potentia multitudinis) and democracy as a regime 
or political order. In decisionist theory, the power of the multitude consists 
of the sum total of decisions people make effective in social reality. One of 
these effects is the formation of power relations resulting in a configuration 
of the power of the multitude we call a political order.14 A democratic regime 
is possible if people trust each other enough to accept dependence on the 
decisions of (all) others.
An important point is that the spiritual realm that surrounds society is not 
the realm of moral truth (reason, justice, faith), but a disseminated field of 
limited perspectives. What becomes obvious in democracy is that my view 
is only one out of many, that the world I live in depends on the decisions 
other people make or have made, and that my own decisions are only a 
very small part thereof. Recognizing this makes it implausible to think of a 
spiritual foundation of political order that does not depend on human deci­
sions. Accordingly, democratic politics entails and must organise the fol­
lowing domains of decisions:
1. The constitutional domain: decisions about territory, nation, citizen­
ship, basic rules of decision­making and so on.
2. The administrative domain: decisions about the administration of those 
things that belong to the business of government and administration 
(the political system). These decisions are in part internal (self­orga n­
izing decisions) and in part external (decisions concerning decisions of 
others outside the political system).
3. The democratic domain: formal or informal decisions of people that are 
part of the political system.
This scheme gives us a clue to the political paradox, on the one hand, and 
to the tensions inherent to democratic political order, on the other hand. 
14 I refer to Benedictus de Spinoza, Theological­Political Treatise, Chapter 16 (supra note 5) 
and Benedictus de Spinoza, Political Treatise, in: Complete Works, (Trans.) Samuel Shirley, 
Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company Inc. 2002, Chapter 2, 4 , 5 and 11.
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The political paradox appears if we connect (1) and (3). How is a democratic 
constitution possible, if decisions can only be taken when based on the very 
constitution that constitutes the people as a whole? Rousseau’s Social con-
tract shows us, as Honig indicates, that this connection is problematic. It is 
problematic because, consciously or not, we acknowledge that it remains 
undecidable whether the constitution we are confronted with is made by 
men inspired by reason, wisdom, divine knowledge or whatever, or by men 
driven by their appetite for power, money, lust and so on. This depends 
on our interpretation, so we (the people, that is, each of us) have to decide 
whether we will appear in public space. As political actors, for example, we 
pretend to know the answer, when providing justifications. Nevertheless, 
we decide.
Yet, if we accept decisionist social ontology as our point of departure, the 
paradox is replaced by the concept of differentiation. We start from the 
premise of the disunity of society and the human world, and the tensions 
that are part of it. Differentiation only becomes paradoxical, or even contra­
dictory, when there is an attempt to represent society as a whole, including 
its spiritual surroundings. Modern democracy is the articulation of the dif­
ferentiation between people’s thoughts, on the one hand, and their partici­
pation in society, on the other. One may develop a complete theory of social 
justice, of moral duty, of legitimacy in one’s mind, but, as soon as a theory is 
expressed in society, it becomes part of a game beyond our power. The only 
thing we can do in society is try to affect, change, or force other people’s 
decisions as we see fit. For others, this theory will appear as a decision to 
take sides. That is what politics is about – at least in a secular age.
A decisionist theory of democracy deals with the tensions inherent to demo­
cratic political order between (3) on the one hand and (1+2) on the other. 
We do not have to exaggerate the impact of the democratic domain. The 
constitutional domain is usually only challenged in times of crisis (social 
struggle, revolution, war). Most decisions in the administrative domain are 
taken without notice, at least publicly. It is business as usual. In normal sit­
uations, ‘the people’ do not really bother about the political system. In fact, 
the democratic domain contains only a small part of politically relevant 
decisions, however important these may be. In most cases, the people only 
rule nominally, not actually. This should be kept in mind, although it is not 
my intention to belittle the achievements of democracy.
7 Conclusion
I am prepared to fully endorse Bonnie Honig’s attempt to go beyond the 
dilemma of ‘decision’ and ‘deliberation’, if ‘decision’ is taken here as indicat­
ing a political position that refers only to a binary logic. Nevertheless, two 
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points need to be added. The first is that the field of thought she is open­
ing up remains within the realm of decisionist theory, provided decision 
is taken as a fundamental category of social ontology. The second is that 
this implies the possibility of conditions in which ‘binary logics’ are inevi­
table. Carl Schmitt was talking about extreme situations (the ‘Ausnahme­
zustand’), not about ‘normal’ politics, which leaves room for a plurality of 
options. One is not always forced to choose sides, but this does not affect the 
idea that, whatever we do in social and political life, we make decisions that 
cannot be founded on absolute principles. In this sense, a critique of theo­
ries of deliberative democracy leads to some form of decisionist theory.
